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Indonesia’s	  Environmental	  Law	  of	  2009	  	  
and	  its	  administrative	  coercion	  provisions;	  
A	  conceptual	  misunderstanding	  with	  large	  practical	  implications?	  
By	  Laure	  d’Hondt1	  
	  
When	  Indonesian	  environmental	  agencies	  are	  confronted	  with	  violations	  of	  the	  environmental	  law	  
by	  industries,	  they	  often	  respond	  either	  by	  attempting	  to	  prosecute	  a	  violator	  criminally	  or	  by	  
facilitating	  mediation	  between	  (alleged)	  violators	  and	  ‘victims’	  of	  the	  environmental	  violation.	  Both	  
approaches	  are	  hoped	  to	  lead	  to	  better	  compliance	  with	  environmental	  standards.	  Frequently	  
however,	  appropriate	  redress	  for	  the	  environmental	  problem	  is	  not	  achieved	  and	  environmental	  
standards	  continue	  to	  be	  violated.2	  	  
From	  a	  legal	  theoretical	  point	  of	  view	  it	  might	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  that	  (attempts)	  to	  
criminally	  prosecute	  and	  mediate	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  remedy	  for	  the	  environmental	  problems.	  After	  all,	  
criminal	  sanctions	  primarily	  have	  a	  punitive	  character	  and	  indirectly	  might	  have	  a	  deterrence	  effect.	  
However,	  they	  do	  not	  allow	  to	  directly	  halt	  a	  violation.3	  For	  example,	  imprisoning	  the	  director	  of	  a	  
company	  does	  not	  guarantee	  that	  the	  committed	  violation	  is	  stopped,	  let	  alone	  that	  it	  stopped	  
immediately	  after	  the	  violation	  is	  discovered.	  The	  criminal	  process	  often	  takes	  quite	  a	  long	  period	  of	  
time.	  	  
When	  it	  comes	  to	  mediation,	  the	  agreed	  outcome	  between	  a	  violator	  and	  the	  affected	  
citizens	  is	  also	  not	  necessarily	  aimed	  at	  improving	  environmental	  behaviour.	  The	  private	  parties	  
involved	  might	  agree	  upon	  (almost)	  anything	  they	  want	  in	  order	  to	  settle	  their	  conflict.	  In	  Indonesian	  
practice	  this	  often	  results	  in	  agreements	  on	  more	  job	  opportunities	  for	  affected	  citizens	  or	  other	  
financial	  or	  benefits	  while	  the	  environmental	  violations	  might	  very	  well	  continue.4	  	  
On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  administrative	  sanctioning	  is	  –	  in	  theory-­‐	  to	  stop	  a	  
violation	  from	  occurring	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  The	  responsible	  executive	  government	  body	  is	  given	  the	  
authority	  to	  use	  these	  sanctions	  as	  ‘tools’	  to	  be	  able	  to	  quickly	  take	  concrete	  actions	  itself	  and	  swiftly	  
restore	  the	  situation	  to	  one	  in	  which	  no	  violation	  occurs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  environmental	  violations	  this	  
could	  mean	  closing	  an	  outlet	  that	  releases	  wastewater,	  or	  other	  measures	  that	  might	  interfere	  with	  
the	  production	  process.	  The	  government	  body	  is	  given	  such	  strong	  powers	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  
general	  interests	  of	  its	  citizens.5	  	  
In	  Indonesia	  however,	  environmental	  agencies	  as	  being	  the	  government	  bodies	  that	  in	  
principle	  are	  responsible	  for	  safeguarding	  the	  environmental	  interests	  of	  its	  citizens,	  seldom	  use	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administrative	  sanctioning	  to	  the	  fullest	  of	  its	  possibilities.	  Although	  warnings	  are	  quite	  often	  given,	  
other	  administrative	  sanctions	  are	  hardly	  ever	  imposed.	  There	  are	  many	  reasons	  for	  this	  limited	  use.	  
The	  economic	  importance	  of	  Industries	  that	  violate	  environmental	  standards	  is	  often	  so	  great	  that	  
taking	  measures	  that	  interfere	  with	  the	  production	  process	  –as	  could	  be	  the	  case	  when	  for	  example	  
administrative	  coercion	  would	  be	  imposed-­‐	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  political	  resistance	  as	  well	  as	  protests	  
by	  workers	  and	  others	  who	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  industries	  directly	  for	  their	  income.	  Furthermore,	  
administrative	  sanctioning	  is	  generally	  considered	  as	  a	  weak	  response	  to	  violations.	  Criminal	  
sanctioning	  is	  regarded	  to	  offer	  a	  much	  tougher	  response.	  
When	  analysing	  the	  legal	  provisions	  on	  administrative	  sanctions	  in	  the	  Environmental	  
Management	  Act	  of	  2009,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  surprising	  that	  administrative	  sanctions	  are	  considered	  weak.	  In	  
this	  paper	  we	  focus	  on	  these	  legal	  provisions,	  in	  particular	  on	  those	  concerning	  administrative	  
coercion.	  We	  compare	  the	  Indonesian	  concepts	  of	  administrative	  coercion	  with	  concepts	  as	  
understood	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  conclude	  they	  differ	  in	  some	  substantial	  manners.	  	  	  
We	  discuss	  the	  most	  classic	  form	  of	  regulation	  which	  is	  ‘command	  and	  control’	  regulation	  
that	  is	  conducted	  by	  the	  government,	  and	  then	  take	  a	  small	  detour	  by	  exploring	  administrative	  
sanctions	  in	  the	  form	  of	  administrative	  coercion	  and	  the	  daily	  fine.	  We	  continue	  by	  returning	  some	  of	  
the	  main	  ideas	  underlying	  	  ‘command	  and	  control’	  regulation,	  namely	  the	  position	  of	  the	  
government	  regarding	  protecting	  general	  interests	  of	  society	  and	  the	  precondition	  that	  the	  
government	  has	  to	  be	  accountable	  for	  its	  actions	  (or	  its	  failure	  to	  take	  action).	  Finally	  the	  paper	  
focuses	  on	  a	  vital	  precondition	  to	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  the	  government	  accountable,	  that	  is	  a	  clear	  division	  
of	  responsibility	  and	  authority.	  	  
The	  paper	  concludes	  that	  from	  a	  legal	  theoretical	  perspective	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  
provisions	  on	  administrative	  coercion	  in	  the	  Indonesian	  environmental	  law	  are	  quite	  problematic	  and	  
in	  practice	  leave	  quite	  some	  room	  for	  confusion	  regarding	  the	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  of	  the	  
government	  to	  swiftly	  halt	  violations.	  Reevaluating	  the	  basic	  concepts	  that	  underpin	  government	  
responses	  to	  environmental	  violations	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  become	  more	  effective	  in	  dealing	  with	  
violations	  of	  the	  environmental	  law	  in	  Indonesia.	  	  
	  
Comparing	  concepts	  of	  administrative	  coercion	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  
	  
‘Setiap	  penanggung	  jawab	  usaha	  dan/atau	  kegiatan	  yang	  tidak	  melaksanakan	  paksaan	  pemerintah	  
dapat	  dikenai	  denda	  atas	  setiap	  keterlambatan	  pelaksanaan	  sanksi	  paksaan	  pemerintah’.	  
‘	  Anyone	  carrying	  responsibility	  for	  a	  business	  and	  /	  or	  activities	  who	  does	  not	  implement	  
administrative	  coercion	  can	  be	  fined	  for	  delaying	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  administrative	  coercive	  
sanction’.	  
(article	  81,	  Environmental	  Management	  Act	  (EMA)	  2009,	  (Undang-­‐Undang	  32/2009)	  
	  
In	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  lawyer	  trained	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  this	  article	  on	  the	  administrative	  fine	  in	  the	  
Indonesian	  Environmental	  Management	  Act	  (EMA)	  seems	  quite	  incoherent.	  Not	  so	  much	  because	  of	  
what	  is	  stated	  about	  the	  fine,	  but	  rather	  because	  of	  what	  is	  inexplicitly	  said	  about	  administrative	  
coercion.	  Unlike	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  where	  administrative	  coercion	  refers	  to	  concrete	  actions	  
undertaken	  exclusively	  by	  the	  government	  to	  halt	  a	  violation,6	  in	  Indonesia	  administrative	  coercion	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  Article	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apparently	  can	  also	  be	  executed	  by	  the	  violator,	  such	  as	  the	  company,	  and	  is	  not	  an	  authority	  
exclusively	  bestowed	  upon	  the	  government.	  This	  article	  reflects	  or	  perhaps	  to	  some	  extent	  causes	  
the	  hesitant	  attitude	  of	  the	  government	  to	  take	  concrete	  measures	  and	  limited	  use	  of	  the	  
administrative	  powers	  that	  they	  have	  been	  provided	  with	  to	  protect	  general	  environmental	  interests.	  	  
To	  examine	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  Indonesian	  concept	  of	  administrative	  coercion	  further,	  we	  
start	  by	  briefly	  looking	  at	  some	  basic	  conceptions	  of	  administrative	  sanctioning	  as	  commonly	  
understood	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  We	  look	  at	  the	  term	  ‘command	  
and	  control’	  as	  the	  classic	  form	  of	  regulation	  that	  is	  entirely	  based	  on	  the	  administrative	  law	  
framework	  and	  fully	  depends	  on	  the	  government.	  	  
 
‘	  Command	  and	  control’	  	  
A	  term	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  administrative	  framework	  for	  regulation,	  also	  regarding	  
environmental	  regulation	  is	  ‘command	  and	  control’.	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  classic	  form	  of	  regulation	  in	  
which	  the	  government	  is	  solely	  responsible	  and	  authorized	  for	  the	  norm	  setting,	  monitoring	  and	  law	  
enforcement.	  	  
The	  government	  ‘commands’	  by	  setting	  the	  norms	  and	  associated	  standards	  for	  behaviour.	  It	  
does	  so	  by	  either	  making	  general	  regulations	  that	  concern	  all	  actors	  that	  have	  certain	  characteristics	  
and	  therefore	  to	  whom	  the	  regulation	  is	  applicable,	  or	  by	  giving	  out	  individual	  licenses.	  Licenses	  
allow	  specifying	  the	  norms,	  standards	  and	  requirements	  in	  individual	  cases.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  responsible	  government	  body	  is	  authorized	  to	  ‘control’,	  meaning	  it	  has	  to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  subjects	  under	  its	  authority	  comply	  with	  these	  norms	  and	  standards.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  
monitoring	  the	  performance	  of	  these	  subjects,	  and	  if	  they	  are	  not	  in	  compliance,	  the	  government	  has	  
the	  authority	  to	  take	  measures	  in	  the	  form	  of	  imposing	  administrative	  sanctions	  to	  create	  a	  situation	  
in	  which	  the	  law	  is	  no	  longer	  being	  violated.	  	  
Enforcing	  the	  administrative	  law	  by	  means	  of	  imposing	  administrative	  sanctions	  is	  relatively	  
easy	  in	  comparison	  with	  criminal	  and	  private	  law	  enforcement.	  Unlike	  the	  latter	  two,	  administrative	  
law	  enforcement	  does	  not	  require	  a	  court	  decision.	  Based	  on	  the	  information	  the	  government	  body	  
has	  gathered	  through	  its	  monitoring,	  it	  may	  decide	  to	  impose	  an	  administrative	  sanction.	  
Administrative	  sanctions	  can	  have	  very	  large	  consequences	  because	  in	  the	  case	  of	  environmental	  
violations	  by	  industries,	  it	  might	  interfere	  with	  the	  production	  process.	  In	  particular	  administrative	  
coercion	  can	  have	  severe	  consequences.	  The	  government	  itself	  takes	  measures	  to	  reach	  the	  goal	  of	  
restoring	  the	  situation	  to	  one	  of	  compliance	  and	  it	  may	  do	  this	  immediately.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
environmental	  violations	  this	  could	  mean	  closing	  an	  outlet	  that	  releases	  wastewater,	  repairing	  an	  
installation	  (and	  later	  send	  the	  bill	  to	  the	  violator)	  or	  taken	  other	  measures	  necessary	  to	  stop	  the	  
violation.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  because	  the	  government	  is	  given	  such	  strong	  powers,	  their	  
actions	  are,	  or	  at	  least	  should	  be,	  subject	  to	  strict	  requirements	  to	  prevent	  misuse	  of	  the	  government	  
of	  these	  powers.	  	  
	  
Keeping	  in	  mind	  that	  administrative	  sanctions	  can	  have	  such	  serious	  consequences,	  it	  is	  
remarkable	  that	  in	  Indonesia	  administrative	  sanctioning	  is	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  weak	  form	  of	  
sanctioning.	  This	  is	  however	  not	  so	  surprising	  when	  we	  think	  back	  of	  article	  81	  and	  consider	  other	  
provisions	  on	  administrative	  sanctions	  in	  the	  EMA.	  The	  Indonesian	  environmental	  law	  of	  2009	  
acknowledges	  four	  types	  of	  administrative	  sanctions:	  the	  warning,	  administrative	  coercion,	  freezing	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of	  the	  license	  and	  revocation	  of	  the	  license.7	  These	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  incremental	  regarding	  their	  
rigorousness;	  the	  warning	  is	  the	  lightest	  sanction,	  revocation	  of	  the	  license	  the	  heaviest.	  In	  practice,	  
when	  the	  government	  decides	  it	  wants	  to	  impose	  an	  administrative	  sanction,	  it	  writes	  a	  warning	  
letter.	  If	  the	  violator	  does	  not	  improve	  its	  behaviour,	  this	  may	  be	  repeated	  another	  two	  times.	  Unlike	  
what	  would	  happen	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  the	  Indonesian	  environmental	  agency	  may	  then	  write	  
another	  letter	  that	  states	  administrative	  coercion	  is	  applied.	  However,	  this	  letter	  does	  not	  
accompany	  any	  concrete	  actions	  by	  the	  government	  to	  halt	  the	  violation.	  The	  letter	  in	  itself	  is	  
considered	  to	  be	  the	  administrative	  coercion.	  This	  is	  fully	  in	  line	  with	  article	  81	  that	  suggests	  that	  the	  
violator	  must	  implement	  the	  administrative	  coercion.	  This	  is	  a	  major	  difference	  with	  how	  
administrative	  coercion	  is	  understood	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  where	  administrative	  coercion	  refers	  to	  
concrete	  actions	  to	  halt	  a	  violation.	  	  
	  In	  Indonesia,	  when	  the	  violator	  still	  does	  not	  take	  measures	  itself	  after	  it	  received	  the	  
‘administrative	  coercion’	  letter,	  the	  government	  body	  concludes	  that	  the	  administrative	  law	  
framework	  has	  been	  ineffective	  and	  the	  case	  needs	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  within	  the	  criminal	  law	  
framework,	  which	  in	  principle	  is	  the	  ultimum	  remedium.8	  In	  many	  cases	  it	  appears	  that	  officials	  even	  
consider	  imposing	  the	  weak	  administrative	  sanctions	  as	  an	  inconvenient	  barrier	  before	  they	  can	  
proceed	  with	  the	  criminal	  prosecution.	  The	  fact	  that	  many	  officials	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  
administrative	  coercion	  means	  that	  the	  government	  will	  take	  concrete	  measures	  explains	  why	  
administrative	  sanctions	  are	  considered	  a	  weak	  response	  to	  violations.	  	  
 
Administrative	  coercion	  (bestuursdwang)	  and	  daily	  fine	  (dwangsom)	  
In	  the	  Netherlands,	  the	  government	  body	  may,	  instead	  of	  imposing	  administrative	  coercion	  
(bestuursdwang),	  impose	  a	  daily	  fine	  (dwangsom).	  This	  latter	  entails	  that	  for	  a	  each	  certain	  period	  of	  
time,	  for	  example	  a	  day	  or	  week,	  that	  a	  violation	  continues,	  a	  fine	  is	  imposed.	  The	  amount	  of	  the	  fine	  
adds	  up	  until	  there	  is	  a	  situation	  of	  compliance	  and	  thereby	  mount	  up	  to	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  
money.	  The	  daily	  fine	  is	  intended	  to	  stimulate	  the	  violator	  to	  itself	  take	  measures	  to	  end	  the	  violation	  
as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	  
The	  goal	  of	  administrative	  coercion	  and	  the	  daily	  fine	  is	  similar;	  halting	  the	  violation	  as	  soon	  
as	  possible.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  administrative	  coercion	  and	  the	  daily	  fines	  are	  
alternatives	  for	  one	  another.	  The	  government	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  impose	  both	  types	  of	  sanctions	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  but	  must	  choose	  which	  sanction	  it	  finds	  most	  appropriate	  in	  a	  certain	  case.	  In	  practice	  
imposing	  a	  daily	  fine	  is	  often	  easier	  then	  applying	  administrative	  coercion.	  After	  all,	  the	  daily	  fine	  
only	  requires	  that	  the	  government	  continuously	  monitors	  whether	  a	  situation	  of	  compliance	  is	  
already	  achieved.	  The	  government	  does	  not	  have	  to	  undertake	  the	  often	  very	  complicated	  concrete	  
actions	  that	  are	  required	  for	  administrative	  coercion.9	  	  
In	  Indonesia,	  the	  environmental	  law	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  sanction	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
daily	  fine.	  When	  we	  again	  take	  a	  look	  at	  article	  81,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  fine	  is	  not	  an	  alternative	  for	  
administrative	  coercion,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  imposed	  only	  after	  the	  administrative	  coercion	  has	  been	  
imposed.	  This	  in	  itself	  is	  remarkable	  because	  imposing	  administrative	  coercion,	  meaning	  that	  the	  
government	  itself	  takes	  concrete	  action	  to	  reach	  a	  situation	  of	  compliance,	  should	  imply	  that	  the	  law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Article	  78,	  EMA	  2009	  
8	  EMA	  2009,	  Elucidation,	  General,	  point	  6,	  (Undang-­‐undang	  32/2009,	  Penjelasan,	  umum	  6)	  
9	  See	  e.g.	  Milieurecht	  (zesde	  druk),	  Ch.W.	  Backers,	  P.C.	  Gilhuis,	  N.S.J.	  Koeman	  (eds)	  (2006),	  Kluwer.	  p.	  272	  e.v.,	  
398.	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is	  already	  no	  longer	  being	  violated.	  However,	  considering	  that	  in	  Indonesia	  administrative	  coercion	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  refer	  to	  concrete	  government	  action,	  this	  makes	  sense	  to	  some	  extent,	  although	  
since	  a	  daily	  fine	  is	  a	  sanction	  that	  can	  be	  imposed	  rather	  easily,	  it	  is	  regrettable	  the	  EMA	  does	  not	  
provide	  for	  such	  a	  sanction.  
 
Protection	  of	  general	  interests	  and	  accountability	  
After	  having	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  the	  administrative	  framework	  for	  
regulation,	  we	  now	  will	  pay	  attention	  to	  what	  can	  be	  expected	  of	  the	  government	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
classic	  ‘command	  and	  control’	  approach	  to	  regulation.	  In	  particular	  in	  Indonesia,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  
government	  rather	  randomly	  decides	  which	  monitoring	  activities	  it	  employs	  and	  how	  they	  follow	  up	  
on	  cases	  where	  allegedly	  violations	  occur.	  A	  clear	  policy	  on	  proceedings	  is	  often	  lacking	  and	  practices	  
differ	  considerably	  at	  different	  environmental	  agencies.	  Thereby	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  know	  what	  can	  be	  
expected	  of	  the	  government	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  extent	  it	  will	  protect	  the	  general	  environmental	  
interests	  of	  its	  citizens.	  	  
	   The	  philosophy	  behind	  the	  ‘command	  and	  control’	  approach	  towards	  regulation	  is	  that	  the	  
government	  is	  just	  given	  authority	  to	  protect	  the	  general	  interests	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  regulations.	  It	  has	  
the	  responsibility	  and	  therefore	  the	  obligation	  to	  execute	  the	  task	  bestowed	  upon	  it	  to	  ensure	  that	  
laws	  are	  not	  being	  violated.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  recent	  decades	  the	  ‘command	  and	  control’	  
approach	  has	  received	  substantial	  critique	  because	  of	  the	  growing	  awareness	  that	  the	  government	  
has	  too	  little	  capacity	  to	  conduct	  all	  the	  required	  norm	  setting,	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  tasks.	  	  	  
	  Nevertheless,	  although	  it	  has	  been	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  government	  might	  not	  be	  
able	  to	  fully	  safeguard	  compliance	  by	  all	  subject	  under	  its	  authority,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  it	  is	  
commonly	  understood	  that	  when	  a	  government	  body	  does	  not	  execute	  the	  task	  given	  to	  it	  by	  
society,	  it	  must	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  this.	  Executive	  bodies	  usually	  have	  discretionary	  power,	  
meaning	  they	  have	  room	  to	  decide	  if,	  when	  and	  how	  they	  will	  respond	  in	  certain	  cases.	  However,	  
policy	  that	  clearly	  states	  the	  guidelines	  regarding	  if	  and	  how	  the	  executive	  body	  undertakes	  certain	  
action	  (or	  not)	  must	  underlie	  the	  decisions	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  government.	  The	  policy	  may	  for	  
example	  state	  that	  priority	  is	  given	  to	  monitoring	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  industries	  (and	  thereby	  other	  
kinds	  of	  industries	  are	  subject	  to	  less	  intensive	  monitoring)	  or	  certain	  protocols	  might	  provide	  details	  
on	  how	  the	  government	  will	  respond	  in	  cases	  with	  particular	  characteristics.	  The	  reason	  to	  have	  clear	  
policies	  on	  these	  matters	  is	  to	  prevent	  the	  government	  from	  behaving	  randomly	  and	  unpredictable.	  
If	  these	  policies	  are	  lacking	  it	  become	  difficult	  to	  create	  transparency	  on	  the	  choices	  of	  the	  
government	  regarding	  its	  actions.	  Thereby	  chances	  for	  inconsistent	  government	  behaviour	  and	  
corruption	  increase	  because	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  hold	  the	  government	  accountable.	  	  
In	  the	  Netherlands,	  the	  responsible	  government	  body	  is	  to	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  its	  
performance.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  government	  body	  or	  the	  political	  leader	  under	  which	  the	  government	  
body	  functions,	  or	  example	  a	  minister,	  is	  politically	  accountable	  for	  what	  the	  government	  body	  does	  
or	  does	  not	  do.	  When	  he	  or	  she	  is	  not	  able	  to	  justify	  the	  government	  body’s	  behaviour	  it	  can	  expect	  
to	  be	  confronted	  with	  this	  by	  parliament	  who	  might	  demand	  an	  explanation,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  voters	  who	  
in	  the	  next	  election	  might	  prefer	  to	  give	  their	  vote	  to	  another	  candidate.	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  
government	  is	  even	  held	  financially	  accountable	  when	  damage	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  insufficient	  
performance	  by	  the	  responsible	  government	  body	  that	  thereby	  executed	  its	  task	  of	  protecting	  the	  
general	  interests	  of	  society	  inadequately.	  This	  creates	  an	  important	  incentive	  for	  the	  government	  to	  
execute	  its	  tasks	  as	  good	  as	  possible	  and	  be	  transparent	  in	  its	  decisions	  and	  actions.	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Division	  of	  authority,	  a	  precondition	  for	  accountability	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  an	  important	  precondition	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  administrative	  law	  scheme	  for	  
command	  and	  control	  regulations	  functions	  well,	  meaning	  that	  licenses	  are	  given	  out	  correctly,	  
monitoring	  is	  sufficient	  and	  appropriate	  measures	  are	  taken	  in	  the	  case	  of	  violations.	  This	  
precondition	  is	  a	  clear	  division	  of	  authority.	  It	  serves	  not	  only	  to	  create	  an	  efficient	  division	  of	  tasks	  
that	  the	  government	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  to	  carry	  out	  and	  prevent	  that	  more	  government	  bodies	  invest	  time	  
and	  energy	  in	  doing	  the	  same	  job.	  It	  also	  allows	  holding	  a	  government	  body	  accountable	  when	  it	  
does	  not	  properly	  execute	  its	  tasks.	  When	  more	  government	  bodies	  are	  or	  may	  be	  responsible	  and	  
thereby	  accountable	  for	  the	  same	  particular	  case,	  this	  creates	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  government	  body	  
to	  escape	  from	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  citizens’	  general	  interests	  that	  it	  is	  to	  safeguard.	  
After	  all,	  it	  becomes	  easy	  to	  blame	  another	  government	  body	  for	  the	  insufficient	  government	  
performance,	  or	  adequate	  handling	  on	  a	  concrete	  case	  might	  be	  obstructed	  by	  meetings	  or	  
disagreements	  on	  how	  to	  handle	  a	  particular	  case.	  	  
In	  Indonesia,	  the	  issue	  of	  division	  of	  authority	  regarding	  environmental	  matters	  has	  been	  
problematic	  since	  the	  first	  environmental	  law	  was	  enacted	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  At	  that	  time	  Indonesia	  
had	  a	  highly	  centralized	  government	  structure.	  Problems	  occurred	  due	  to	  the	  overlapping	  and	  
conflicting	  regulations	  that	  were	  spread	  out	  over	  various	  sectors	  involved,	  such	  as	  the	  departments	  
of	  mining	  and	  forestry.	  The	  ministry	  of	  environment	  then	  had	  no	  executing	  powers	  and	  was	  to	  
coordinate	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  other	  sectors.	  Although	  today	  the	  ministry	  and	  environmental	  agencies	  
at	  lower	  administrative	  levels	  have	  more	  administrative	  powers,	  sectoral	  incoherency	  and	  conflicting	  
interests	  still	  are	  problematic.10	  However,	  since	  the	  government	  structure	  became	  decentralized,	  
more	  unclarity	  arose	  regarding	  which	  administrative	  level	  is	  responsible	  and	  authorized	  in	  a	  certain	  
case.	  In	  particular	  in	  cases	  of	  transboundary	  environmental	  impact,	  and	  the	  transfer	  of	  authority	  due	  
to	  second	  line	  enforcement	  in	  practice	  leads	  to	  unclear	  responsibilities	  and	  authorities	  between	  the	  
various	  administrative	  bodies.	  Remarkably,	  many	  officials	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  perceive	  this	  as	  a	  problem.	  
They	  seem	  to	  prefer	  to	  deal	  with	  cases	  in	  which	  violations	  take	  place	  by	  involving	  as	  many	  
government	  bodies	  as	  possible	  to	  be	  able	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  a	  violator	  to	  change	  its	  behaviour.	  
Despite	  the	  rather	  far-­‐reaching	  decentralisation	  process,	  involving	  bodies	  of	  a	  higher	  administrative	  
level	  -­‐	  such	  as	  the	  province	  (when	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  a	  case	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  at	  district	  level)	  and	  the	  ministry	  
-­‐	  is	  a	  popular	  way	  to	  handle	  cases.	  Apparently	  the	  old	  hierarchic	  structures	  are	  still	  very	  present	  in	  
today’s	  Indonesia.	  One	  can	  imagine	  that	  not	  only	  does	  this	  lead	  to	  an	  enormous	  burden	  on	  the	  
higher	  levels	  of	  government,	  one	  could	  even	  argue	  that	  the	  dependence	  on	  these	  higher	  levels	  
makes	  the	  lower	  levels	  less	  active	  to	  themselves	  take	  responsibility.	  After	  all,	  they	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  
held	  accountable	  if	  they	  fail	  their	  task.	  Taken	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  many	  government	  bodies	  are	  
involved	  and	  it	  remains	  unclear	  which	  of	  these	  carries	  the	  final	  responsibility	  makes	  it	  for	  the	  
Indonesian	  citizens	  difficult	  to	  know	  which	  government	  body	  they	  can	  expect	  to	  protect	  their	  
interests	  and	  hold	  it	  accountable	  when	  it	  fails	  its	  task.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  ‘Decentralized	  environmental	  management’	  N.	  Niessen	  (2006).	  In:	  Environmental	  Law	  in	  Development;	  
Lessons	  from	  the	  Indonesian	  Experience	  (eds.	  M.	  Faure	  and	  N.	  Niessen).	  Edward	  Elgard	  Publishing.	  
‘Consequenses	  of	  Decentralization:	  Environmental	  Impact	  Assessment	  and	  Water	  Pollution	  Control	  in	  
Indonesia’	  A.	  Bedner	  (2009),	  Law	  and	  Policy,	  vol.	  32,	  issue	  1,	  January	  2010,	  p	  38-­‐60.	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Conclusion:	  Back	  to	  conceptual	  basics	  
The	  approaches	  frequently	  chosen	  by	  environmental	  agencies	  to	  respond	  to	  violations,	  
namely	  facilitating	  mediation	  or	  attempting	  to	  criminally	  prosecute	  a	  violator,	  often	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  
the	  halting	  of	  the	  violation.	  From	  a	  legal	  theoretical	  view	  this	  is	  not	  surprising	  since	  criminal	  
sanctioning	  and	  the	  agreed	  outcome	  of	  mediation	  are	  not	  primarily	  aimed	  at	  halting	  a	  violation.	  
Imposing	  administrative	  sanctioning	  is	  primarily	  aimed	  at	  this	  goal	  but	  is	  seldom	  used	  to	  the	  fullest	  of	  
its	  potential	  by	  Indonesia’s	  environmental	  agencies.	  	  
The	  paper	  concludes	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  provisions	  
on	  administrative	  coercion.	  The	  interpretation	  of	  the	  concept	  not	  only	  differs	  considerably	  from	  the	  
concept	  of	  administrative	  coercion	  as	  understood	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  It	  leaves	  quite	  some	  room	  for	  
confusion	  on	  what	  authorities	  the	  government	  has	  and	  should	  use	  to	  swiftly	  halt	  violations.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  law	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  a	  daily	  fine	  seems	  a	  missed	  opportunity	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  more	  effectively	  deal	  with	  violations.	  	  
The	  paper	  finally	  concludes	  that	  for	  the	  administrative	  law	  framework	  to	  function	  well,	  the	  
responsible	  government	  bodies	  should	  be	  accountable	  when	  they	  fail	  their	  task	  of	  protecting	  general	  
environmental	  interests.	  Accountability	  should	  function	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  the	  government	  to	  set	  
norms	  properly,	  monitor	  sufficiently	  and	  take	  adequate	  measures	  to	  halt	  violations.	  A	  clear	  division	  
of	  responsibility,	  and	  the	  authority	  given	  to	  the	  responsible	  government	  body	  to	  be	  able	  to	  execute	  
its	  tasks,	  is	  a	  vital	  precondition	  to	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  a	  particular	  government	  body	  accountable.	  Steps	  
towards	  such	  a	  clearer	  division	  are	  urgently	  required	  in	  Indonesia.	  	  
Returning	  to	  the	  basic	  conceptions	  and	  philosophies	  behind	  different	  types	  of	  responses	  
might	  help	  to	  evaluate	  and	  discuss	  what	  in	  fact	  are	  or	  could	  be	  more	  effective	  approaches	  to	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